Update Scoringmodel.md

This commit is contained in:
Mykola Siusko 2023-02-04 18:31:32 +01:00 odevzdal GitHub
rodič e5bd34f1a6
revize 9edf57e97c
V databázi nebyl nalezen žádný známý klíč pro tento podpis
ID GPG klíče: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
1 změnil soubory, kde provedl 48 přidání a 47 odebrání

Zobrazit soubor

@ -11,50 +11,50 @@
![alt text](https://github.com/Msiusko/web3privacy/blob/main/Web3privacynowplatform/Staticobjects/Screenshot%202023-02-04%20at%2017.03.45.png?raw=true)
## On-going community research (survey) within the privacy experts.
I asked experts behind privacy-services or contributors to the privacy-centric communities to share their visions on how to analyse if a service is private or not. Answers were collected via chats & survey [form](https://forms.gle/ETBEZed9LUUtLWT87)
I asked experts behind privacy-services or contributors to the privacy-centric communities to share their visions on analysing whether a service is private. Answers were collected via chats & survey [form](https://forms.gle/ETBEZed9LUUtLWT87)
**Criterias**:
**Criteria**:
- min 50 different experts
- broad range of positions: tech, ops, marketing, devrel, strategy
- broad range of services: from privacy coins to mixnets
- a broad range of positions: tech, ops, marketing, devrel, strategy
- a broad range of services: from privacy coins to mixnets
- different geographies: from the USA to Russia
# Questions from the privacy experts
# Take 1
- does it has untracebility ? (ie addresses is hidden from public ledger)
- does it has unlinkability? (ie transactions can't be linked between each other)
- does amount of transfer is hidden?
- does IP address of participants hidden?
- is it decentralized and based on opensource technology ?
- does it has traceability? (ie addresses is hidden from the public ledger)
- does it has unlinkability? (ie transactions can't be linked to each other)
- does the amount of transfer is hidden?
- does IP addresses of participants hidden?
- is it decentralized and based on open-source technology?
# Take 2
| Question | Observation |
| ------------- | ------------- |
| much the users in control of their data disclosure? | (Scale 1-10) |
| how well commnity feedback and evaluation is built into product dev? | the less -» the more centralised it is -» the smaller the % of it staying private without the collectiv intelligence. this is like the web3privacynow - platform part actually, for sales but also i found this really relevant. |
| is there a community bug / security bounty program / platform? | yes, no |
| how much transparent disclosure is avaliable on the tech and company | ike smart contract audits, security audits,source of financing? |
| how private the tech stack it uses on all layers. from hardware to l3/l4 etc. | how well it is disclosed what they built on and where they host stuff, or if the tech is decentralised like nym - is there avaialbe dashboard data about this? |
| product roadmap and release flexibiity - this is harder one, and I'm not sure it makes sense. what i mean is its also important to have a clear vision but at the same time to react to current needs / bugs / fixing vulnerabilities. | maybe its redundant with no2 and no2b |
| how well community feedback and evaluation is built into product dev? | the less -» the more centralized it is -» the smaller the % of it staying private without collective intelligence. This is like the web3privacynow - platform part, actually, for sales, but also I found this really relevant. |
| is there a community bug/security bounty program/platform? | yes, no |
| how much transparent disclosure is available on the tech and company | like smart contract audits, security audits, source of financing? |
| how private the tech stack it uses on all layers. from hardware to l3/l4 etc. | how well it is disclosed what they built on and where they host stuff, or if the tech is decentralized like nym - is there available dashboard data about this? |
| product roadmap and release flexibility - this is a harder one, and I'm not sure it makes sense. What I mean is it's also important to have a clear vision while reacting to current needs/bugs /fixing vulnerabilities. | maybe its redundant with no2 and no2b |
# Take 3
1. What are the trust assumptions the user has by using the platform?
2. What and how is user information stored and transmitted?
3. How much PII is it stored/collected?
3. How much PII is stored/collected?
4. How is information collected + processed + disseminated
5. How completely you can participate with total privacy?
5. How completely can you participate with total privacy?
# Take 4
| Direction | Observation |
| ------------- | ------------- |
| network privacy | how do you connect to the chain? can you do it via Tor? |
| blockchain privacy | do the resulting on chain transactions offer the user any on chain obfuscation? |
| censorship resistance | how resistant is the project to external pressure. will the project censor you? |
| permission | do I need to create an account to access the thing or is the thing open access? |
| custody of funds | at any point is the user out of control of their own keys? |
| network privacy | how do you connect to the chain? Can you do it via Tor? |
| blockchain privacy | do the resulting on-chain transactions offer the user any on-chain obfuscation? |
| censorship resistance | how resistant is the project to external pressure? Will the project censor you? |
| permission | do I need to create an account to access the thing, or is the thing open access? |
| custody of funds | is the user out of control of their keys at any point? |
# Categorisation
@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ I asked experts behind privacy-services or contributors to the privacy-centric c
# Third-party analisys
- ask about its weaknesses from competitors
- Number of peer reviewed articles at conferences and journals of team members
- Where's the code, has it been audited
- Number of peer-reviewed articles at conferences and journals of team members
- Where's the code? Has it been audited?
- Validation by trusted and respected independent scientists and researchers
# VCs
@ -98,17 +98,17 @@ I asked experts behind privacy-services or contributors to the privacy-centric c
# Team
- ideological team
- Reputation of team
- is it purely marketing oriented or it seems created by researcher/developers, are the developers anons?
- Reputation of the team
- is it purely marketing oriented, or it seems created by researchers/developers, are the developers anons?
# Privacy policy
- Privacy Policy content
- Non-vague, and non-intrusive privacy policy
- Non-vague and non-intrusive privacy policy
- #privacy protection policies
# Token
- is there a token since the beginning ?
- if token since beginning, weird
- is there a token since the beginning?
- if the token since beginning - weird
# Infrastructure
- How much to run a node.
@ -117,20 +117,20 @@ I asked experts behind privacy-services or contributors to the privacy-centric c
# Storage
- e2e encrypted LOCAL storage
- What user information is stored? (username, IP address, last connectino, wallets associate, etc)
- Where is it stored? (centralized server, certain jurisdictions, on chain, in browser/local cache)
- What user information is stored? (username, IP address, last connection, wallets associate, etc)
- Where is it stored? (centralized server, certain jurisdictions, on-chain, in browser/local cache)
# Data aggregation
- no email or tel nr for signup
- control over personal data
- does not implement kyc or aml
- does not implement KYC or AML
- Metadata privacy / Minimal to no metadata capture
# Traction
- Amount of transactions
- number of people using it
- is it famous
- Time of test and battletested code - (e.g. how BSC had passed the stress time of withdrawals with FTX drama or crypto schemes such as ECDSA with more than 2-3 decades alive)
- Time of test and battle-tested code - (e.g. how BSC had passed the stress time of withdrawals with FTX drama or crypto schemes such as ECDSA with more than 2-3 decades alive)
- Latency
- Cost
@ -138,15 +138,15 @@ I asked experts behind privacy-services or contributors to the privacy-centric c
- DAO structure (if applied)
# Privacy execution
- How is it being transmited? (encrypted, unencrypted, offuscated, etc)
- How is it being transmitted? (encrypted, unencrypted, offuscated, etc)
- Confidentiality of transactions
- ability to hide transactional data from the public
- the ability to hide transactional data from the public
- strong encryption algorithms
- If the speed in connection is too fast most probably there no privacy there and rather a direct channel between user - app
- If the speed in connection is too fast, there most probably no privacy there and rather a direct channel between user - app
- p2p / no central server
- Reliant on one encryption method or multiple
- Combined those encryption methods effectively (holistic solution)
- Trustless - No ID required (this is where ZK's are useful)
- Trustless - No ID required (this is where ZKs are useful)
- Usage of ZK
# Product-centric
@ -160,28 +160,29 @@ I asked experts behind privacy-services or contributors to the privacy-centric c
- Other tooling to verify e.g. block explorers
# Other
- Entropy (non-trivial to estimate, different measurements for type of service) some examples: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04259 or https://blog.nymtech.net/an-empirical-study-of-privacy-scalability-and-latency-of-nym-mixnet-ff05320fb62d
- Entropy (non-trivial to estimate, different measurements for type of service). Some examples: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04259 or https://blog.nymtech.net/an-empirical-study-of-privacy-scalability-and-latency-of-nym-mixnet-ff05320fb62d
- Censorship-resistant (how hard it's for a powerful party to block/censor a given service)
- Precise description of the concrete privacy properties. Privacy is complicated so if they don't say exactly what they protect, then its likely vapor
- Precise description of the concrete privacy properties. Privacy is complicated, so if they don't say exactly what they protect, then its likely vapour
- Doesnt sell your data
- protects against global passive adversary
- protects against a global passive adversary
- strong secure anonymity tech
- Credibly neutral
- ISO/IEC 29190:2015: https://www.iso.org/standard/45269.html
- Anonymity Assessment – A Universal Tool for Measuring Anonymity of Data Sets Under the GDPR with a Special Focus on Smart Robotics: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3971139
# My personal notes on privacy-scoring (they were made made before communal survey)
_Sketches what could be put inside privacy-solutions scoring model_ (note: think of these as questions to experts for workshop on scoring ideation).
# My personal notes on privacy scoring (they were made before communal survey)
_Sketches what could be put inside privacy-solutions scoring model_ (note: think of these as questions to experts for a workshop on scoring ideation).
**Open-source transparency**
- **GitHub repos**: # of commits, # stars, date of repo creation.
**Third party validation**
**Third-party validation**
- **Security audits**: yes, no; type of audit; ammount of audits.
**Community validation**
- Existing bugs
- White hackers assesment (like Secret Network TEE bug)
- White hackers assessment (like Secret Network TEE bug)
- Negative Discord, Twitter, other public feedback (product & founder-centric)
**Team**
@ -197,19 +198,19 @@ _Sketches what could be put inside privacy-solutions scoring model_ (note: think
**Liveliness**
- How active is GitHub activity
- How active is community
- Is there a public product traction?
- How active is the community
- Is there public product traction?
**Product-readiness**
- State of product-readiness
- MVP-readiness
- Protocol (test-net/main-net)
- dApp (release timing, third party validation like AppStore/Play Store)
- dApp (release timing, third-party validation like AppStore/Play Store)
- network-reliability (the state of privacy in Ethereum, Solana, Avalanche etc)
**Cross-checked data leakage**
- Complementing privacy stack data leakage (example: phone + dApp; wallet + RPC etc)
- Third party data leakage (from the hackers to state agents (think of Iran or North Korea govs))
- Third-party data leakage (from the hackers to state agents (think of Iran or North Korean govs))
**Data aggregation policies**